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INTRODUCTION 
In 1974, seventeen year-old Daryl Coston was convicted of raping 
two adult women.1  In 2005, one year after his release from prison, 
Coston learned that the Ohio General Assembly had passed a law 
forbidding sex offenders from living within 1,000 feet of schools.2  
Because of the law, Coston was unable to find a place to live and risked 
becoming homeless.3  Coston, along with other sex offenders, filed suit 
in the United States District Court for the Southern District of Ohio 
alleging, among other claims, that Ohio’s residency restriction 
retroactively imposed punishment in violation of the Ex Post Facto 
Clause.4  The district court dismissed the case.5 
Perhaps you are thinking, “so what?  Coston committed terrible 
crimes.  He and other sex offenders deserve no sympathy.  Too bad if 
they can’t find places to live.”  But does the Constitution condone 
imposing such harsh burdens retroactively on maligned groups in the 
name of public safety?  Though courts frequently answer this question 
in the affirmative, it is unclear that the Framers would have agreed. 
The Framers considered the Constitution’s Ex Post Facto Clause6 to 
be one of the most important safeguards of liberty.  The Clause 
prohibits retroactively punishing someone, including by “chang[ing] 
the punishment, and inflict[ing] a greater punishment, than the law 
 
 Assistant Professor of Law, Northern Kentucky University Salmon P. Chase College 
of Law; Executive Director, Ohio Justice & Policy Center; A.B., Duke University; J.D., 
Harvard Law School.  I am very appreciative of the time, insights, and assistance 
provided by my law school colleague Donna Spears, my research assistants Tamara 
Scull and Colin P. Pool, my OJPC colleague Sasha Appatova, and my friend and former 
colleague Michael Pinard.  I dedicate this Article to my wife Verna Williams and my 
daughter Allison. 
1 Second Amended Class Action Complaint at ¶¶ 42–43, Coston v. Petro, No. 1:05-cv-
00125 (S.D. Ohio May 26, 2005). 
 2  Id. at ¶¶ 53, 70. 
 3  Id. at ¶ 73. 
 4  Id. at ¶¶ 120–21. 
 5  Coston v. Petro, 398 F. Supp. 2d 878, 883, 885–87 (S.D. Ohio 2005) (dismissing 
action for lack of standing but concluding that plaintiffs would not be able to 
demonstrate that the statute imposed punishment for Ex Post Facto purposes). 
 6  U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10. 
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annexed to the crime, when committed.”7  James Madison believed ex 
post facto laws to be “contrary . . . to every principle of sound 
legislation.”8  Agreeing with Madison, Alexander Hamilton observed 
that the prohibition against ex post facto laws is among the “three 
great[est] securities to liberty and republicanism . . . “9  Contemporary 
scholars agree that the Ex Post Facto Clause is intended to protect 
“against the hydraulic pressures that periodically beset our 
majoritarian political processes and compel lawmakers to impose 
retroactive punishments on maligned individuals and groups of the 
moment.”10 
Although the prohibition against creating new punishments for 
past acts is stitched into the Constitution’s fabric, courts have struggled 
to answer the threshold question of what amounts to punishment 
under the Ex Post Facto clause.  The threshold question turns on 
whether a punishment is “criminal” or “civil” in nature.11  While 
legislatures are constrained from enacting statutes that impose new 
criminal penalties retroactively,12 they have power to pass civil, 
regulatory laws that may incidentally burden people who have already 
been convicted of a crime and have completed their sentences.13  Thus, 
a central question in ex post facto cases is whether a statute is punitive 
or regulatory.14 
This question has become increasingly important in recent years 
due to the promulgation of ostensibly regulatory laws aimed at 
protecting the community from sex offenders—one of the most 
reviled, feared, and marginalized groups in society.15  These laws 
 
 7  Calder v. Bull, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 386, 390 (1798) (opinion of Chase, J.). 
 8  James Madison, THE FEDERALIST NO. 44, at 282 (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961). 
 9  Alexander Hamilton, THE FEDERALIST NO. 84, at 511 (Clinton Rossiter ed., 
1961). 
 10  Wayne A. Logan, The Ex Post Facto Clause and the Jurisprudence of Punishment, 35 
AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1261, 1267 (1988) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 11  Id. at 1268 (describing Supreme Court’s punishment jurisprudence as “an 
incoherent muddle”). 
 12  Cal. Dep’t of Corr. v. Morales, 514 U.S. 499, 504 (1999); Collins v. Youngblood, 
497 U.S. 37, 43 (1990); Calder, 3 U.S. at 390. 
 13  Kansas v. Hendricks, 521 U.S. 346, 361 (1997); United States v. Ward, 448 U.S. 
242, 248–49 (1980). 
 14  Id. 
 15  See, e.g., McKune v. Lile, 536 U.S. 24, 32 (2002) (plurality opinion) (“Sex 
offenders are a serious threat in this Nation.”); Cassie Dallas, Not in My Backyard: The 
Implications of Sex Offender Residency Ordinances in Texas and Beyond, 41 TEX. TECH L. REV. 
1235, 1237 (2009) (“[C]ommunity members have been forced out of their 
neighborhoods and branded as social pariahs because they are sex offenders—a 
reviled and vilified class.”); Meghan Sil• Towers, Protectionism, Punishment and Pariahs: 
Sex Offenders and Residence Restrictions, 15 J.L. & POL’Y 291, 292 (2007) (referring to laws 
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include residency restrictions, which forbid convicted sex offenders 
from living within a certain radius from places where children 
congregate (e.g., schools, daycare facilities, and parks).16  Although the 
United States Supreme Court has held that sex offender registration 
schemes do not impose punishment,17 the question of whether 
residency restrictions are punitive has not been definitively decided.18 
Courts use a two-pronged test when determining whether a 
particular sanction is punitive.19  Under the first prong, courts initially 
consider whether the legislature clearly intended the statute to be 
punitive.20  If so, then the statute is deemed punitive and cannot be 
applied retroactively.21  If the court determines that the legislature 
intended the statute to be civil and non-punitive, then the court must 
determine whether the effect of the statute is nonetheless punitive by 
the “clearest proof.”22 
 
that “make[] pariahs out of sex offenders.”); Lindsay A. Wagner, Sex Offender Residency 
Restrictions: How Common Sense Places Children at Risk, 1 DREXEL L. REV. 175, 175 (2009) 
(“Sex offenders, as a group, incite the public’s fear and hatred, and politicians seeking 
to curry electorate favor often support increasingly harsh sanctions against these 
‘political pariahs of our day.’”) (citation omitted); Roger N. Lancaster, Sex Offenders: 
The Last Pariahs, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 20, 2011), http://www.nytimes.com/2011/08/21/ 
opinion/sunday/sex-offenders-the-last-pariahs.html?pagewanted=all (“The most 
intense dread, fueled by shows like ‘America’s Most Wanted’ and ‘To Catch a 
Predator,’ is directed at the lurking stranger, the anonymous repeat offender.”). 
 16  See David A. Singleton, Sex Offender Residency Restrictions and the Culture of Fear: 
The Case for More Meaningful Rational Basis Review of Fear-Driven Public Safety Laws, 3 U. 
ST. THOMAS L.J. 600, 607–09 (2006) (describing the proliferation of sex offender 
residency restrictions). 
 17  Smith v. Doe, 538 U.S. 84 (2003). 
 18  Compare Doe v. Miller, 405 F.3d 700 (8th Cir. 2005) (holding that Iowa’s sex 
offender residency statute does not impose punishment for Ex Post Facto purposes); 
Parker v. King, No. 2:07-CV-624-WKW, 2008 WL 901087 (M.D. Ala. Mar. 31, 2008) 
(same holding regarding Alabama’s residency statute); Cunningham v. Parkersburg 
Hous. Auth., No. 6:05-cv-00940, 2007 WL 712392 (S.D. W. Va. Mar. 6, 2007) (same 
holding regarding West Virginia’s residency statute); Doe v. Baker, No. Civ. A. 1:05-
CV-2265, 2006 WL 905368 (N.D. Ga. Apr. 5, 2006) (same holding regarding Georgia’s 
residency statute); Graham v. Henry, No. 06-CV-381-TCK-FHM, 2006 WL 2645130 
(N.D. Okla. Sept. 14, 2006) (holding that residency restriction did not impose 
punishment for double jeopardy purposes); with Mikaloff v. Walsh, No. 5:06-CV-96, 
2007 WL 2572268 (N.D. Ohio Sept. 4, 2007) (concluding that Ohio’s residency 
restriction is an unconstitutional ex post facto law); Does I-IV v. City of Indianapolis, No. 
1:06-CV-865-RLY-WTL, 2006 WL 2927598 (S.D. Ind. Oct. 5, 2006) (same holding 
regarding Indiana’s residency statute); and Commonwealth v. Baker, 295 S.W.3d 437 
(Ky. 2009) (holding that application of Kentucky residency statute to defendant 
violated prohibition on ex post facto laws). 
 19  Smith, 538 U.S. at 92; Kansas v. Hendricks, 521 U.S. 346, 361 (1997). 
 20  Hendricks, 521 U.S. at 361. 
 21  Smith, 538 U.S. at 92. 
 22  Smith, 538 U.S. at 92; Hendricks, 521 U.S. at 361. 
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In Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez,23 the Supreme Court articulated a 
list of seven non-exhaustive factors to guide the analysis of whether a 
sanction is punitive in effect.24  The Mendoza-Martinez framework has 
been criticized on a number of grounds, including that it leads to 
unprincipled, results-oriented decisions.25 
Despite the many scholars and courts calling for Mendoza-Martinez 
to be jettisoned in its entirety,26 there is no indication that the Supreme 
Court will abandon its framework.  Indeed, over the last fifty years, the 
framework has been used in a variety of contexts to determine whether 
statutory sanctions impose punishment.27 
There is no doubt that punishment determinations under 
Mendoza-Martinez need to be improved.  However, this Article will 
argue that it is possible to improve these determinations without 
abdicating the Mendoza-Martinez framework.  Specifically, it will explore 
a novel prescriptive remedy for improving these punishment 
determinations: allowing courts to consider public opinion regarding 
whether a sanction is punitive in effect.  This approach will improve 
punishment determinations by introducing common sense into the 
Mendoza-Martinez analysis, which could force courts to render more 
intellectually honest decisions about what does and does not constitute 
punishment. 
Part I begins with a brief discussion of the criticisms directed at 
the Mendoza-Martinez framework by scholars and jurists, including that 
(1) Mendoza-Martinez is too deferential to the legislatures; (2) the 
framework is subjective and therefore easily manipulated by results-
oriented judges; and (3) analysis of the factors is largely circular.  Part 
I then explores how those concerns are amplified when the framework 
is applied to sex offenders, who are easy targets for oppressive, if not 
vindictive, laws ostensibly passed as public safety measures.  Three cases 
illustrate the problem: Kansas v. Hendricks,28 where the Supreme Court 
 
 23  372 U.S. 144 (1963). 
 24  Id. at 168–69. 
 25  See infra notes 48–60 and accompanying text. 
 26  See infra notes 61–63 and accompanying text. 
 27  See, e.g., Dep’t of Revenue v. Kurth Ranch, 511 U.S. 767 (1994) (applying 
Mendoza-Martinez to hold that imposition of a special drug tax constituted 
punishment); United States v. One Assortment of 89 Firearms, 465 U.S. 354 (1984) 
(using Mendoza-Martinez factors to conclude that civil forfeiture did not impose 
punishment for double jeopardy purposes); United States v. Ward, 448 U.S. 242 
(1980) (applying Mendoza-Martinez to conclude that monetary penalty was civil and 
therefore did not trigger the procedural protections afforded to criminal defendants); 
Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520 (1979) (using Mendoza-Martinez framework to hold that 
conditions of pre-trial confinement were not punitive). 
 28  521 U.S. 346 (1997). 
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held that continuing to confine a dangerous sex offender at the end 
of his prison sentence did not impose punishment for Ex Post Facto 
purposes; Smith v. Doe,29 where the Supreme Court held that subjecting 
sex offenders to registration and community notification requirements 
was not punitive; and Doe v. Miller,30 where the Eighth Circuit held that 
sex offender residency restrictions do not constitute punishment.31 
Part II responds to the criticisms of Mendoza-Martinez by arguing 
that courts should consider public opinion as a factor when 
determining what constitutes punishment.  This part discusses other 
contexts where courts have considered public opinion evidence, and 
addresses whether the rationales for admitting public opinion surveys 
in those cases should apply to punishment determinations under 
Mendoza-Martinez.  It contends that public opinion surveys, provided 
their methodologies are sound, are relevant and admissible under 
Mendoza-Martinez to aid courts in determining whether a statute has a 
punitive effect, and argues that including public opinion as a factor 
under Mendoza-Martinez partially addresses the problems identified in 
Part I by adding a measure of objectivity to the analysis. 
Shifting from Part II’s more abstract and conceptual discussion, 
Part III describes a specific study which explored whether the public 
believes residency restrictions for sex offenders and drunk drivers 
impose additional punishment.32  Although there are no known 
residency restrictions for DUI33 offenders, the study asked about these 
hypothetical restrictions to determine whether public opinion about 
the punitive nature of residency restrictions depends on the crime of 
conviction.  Briefly, the study found that a majority of respondents 
believed that making DUI offenders and sex offenders leave their 
homes was punitive.34  A majority also believed that prohibiting a DUI 
offender from moving to a new residence within 1,000 feet of a place 
that sells alcohol would impose additional punishment.35  However, a 
minority believed that prohibiting sex offenders from moving to a new 
residence near a school was not punitive.36  The point of discussing this 
 
 29  538 U.S. 84 (2003). 
 30  405 F.3d 700 (8th Cir. 2005). 
 31  Id. at 719–23. 
 32  Jill S. Levenson, Ryan T. Shields & David A. Singleton, Collateral Punishments and 
Sentencing Policy: Perceptions of Residence Restrictions for Sex Offenders and Drunk Drivers, 25 
CRIM. J. POL’Y REV. 135 (2014). 
 33  DUI is the acronym for “driving under the influence,” a phrase commonly used 
to refer to drunk driving offenses.  BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 576 (9th ed. 2009). 
 34  Levenson et al., supra note 32, at 145. 
 35  Id. at 144. 
 36  Id. at 146. 
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study is not to suggest that its findings should be definitive proof, one 
way or the other, of whether residency restrictions are punitive in 
effect.  Rather, the study is valuable because it illuminates how public 
opinion results can inform the courts’ analysis of whether a particular 
sanction punishes. 
 I. DETERMINING WHAT IS PUNITIVE IN EFFECT 
A. The Mendoza-Martinez Framework and Its Criticisms 
Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez was not an Ex Post Facto case.  The 
question at issue was whether a federal statute stripping United States 
citizenship from persons who left or remained outside of the country 
to avoid military service imposed punishment for the purpose of 
triggering the procedural safeguards guaranteed by the Fifth and Sixth 
Amendments.37 
The Court held that the “punitive nature of the sanction here is 
evident under the tests traditionally applied to determine whether an 
Act of Congress is penal or regulatory in character . . . .”38  The Court 
then articulated seven factors it had considered in previous cases to 
determine the existence of punishment: (1) whether the statute  
imposes an affirmative disability or restraint; (2) whether the resulting 
sanction or burden has historically been regarded as punishment; (3) 
whether the statute “comes into play only on a finding of scienter;” (4) 
whether the statute promotes retribution and deterrence, traditional 
aims of punishment; (5) “whether the behavior to which it applies is 
already a crime;” (6) whether the statute is rationally connected to an 
alternative purpose other than punishment; and (7) whether the 
statutory sanction or burden appears excessive in relation to the 
alternative purpose.39  According to the Court, these seven factors are 
“all relevant to the [punishment] inquiry, and may often point in 
different directions.”40 
However, beyond its conclusory statement that the “punitive 
nature of the sanction here is evident,”41 the Court did not analyze the 
seven factors.  Instead, the Court held that the legislative history 
showed that Congress intended the statute “to serve as an additional 
penalty for a special category of draft evader.”42 
 
 37  Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez, 372 U.S. 144, 163–64 (1963). 
 38  Id. at 168. 
 39  Id. at 168–69. 
 40  Id. at 169. 
 41  Id. at 168. 
 42  Id. at 169–70. 
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Mendoza-Martinez foreshadowed the Supreme Court’s 
announcement of a two-pronged punishment test in United States v. 
Ursery,43 a double jeopardy case.  Under the two-pronged test, courts 
must first determine whether the legislature intended for a statute to 
punish.44  A finding that the legislature intended punishment ends the 
inquiry for purposes of the constitutional protection at issue.45  But if 
the legislative intent was to establish a civil regulatory scheme, then 
courts go to the second step of examining the Mendoza-Martinez factors 
to determine whether the sanction or burden imposed by the statute 
is punitive in effect.46  Under the second prong, “‘only the clearest 
proof’ will suffice to override legislative intent and transform what has 
been denominated a civil remedy into a criminal penalty.”47 
Scholars and jurists have criticized Mendoza-Martinez on a number 
of grounds.  First, given the Ex Post Facto Clause’s role in safeguarding 
liberty, critics of the Mendoza-Martinez approach contend that the 
framework is too deferential to the legislature.48  According to 
Professor Wayne Logan, the Ex Post Facto Clause serves two important 
purposes.49  First, the Framers considered ex post facto laws to be 
“especially unfair because they deprive citizens of notice of the 
wrongfulness of behavior, and thus result in unjust deprivations.”50  
Thus, the Ex Post Facto Clause “ensures that legislative acts ‘give fair 
 
 43  518 U.S. 267, 288 (1996). 
 44  Id.; see, e.g., Smith v. Doe, 538 U.S. 84, 92 (applying Ursery’s two-pronged 
punishment test in Ex Post Facto context); Kansas v. Hendricks, 521 U.S. 346, 361 
(1997) (same). 
 45  Smith, 538 U.S. at 92. 
 46  Id. at 92–97; Hendricks, 521 U.S. at 361–62. 
 47  Hudson v. United States, 522 U.S. 93, 100 (1997) (quoting U.S. v. Ward, 448 
U.S. 242, 249 (1980)). 
 48  See Aaron Xavier Fellmeth, Civil and Criminal Sanctions in the Constitution and 
Courts, 94 GEO. L.J. 1, 36 (2005) (referring to the “deep flaw of judicial deference to 
the legislature” inherent in the Mendoza-Martinez framework); Logan, supra note 10, at 
1287 (criticizing the “highly deferential two-pronged ‘intents-effects’ test”); see also 
John F. Stinneford, Punishment Without Culpability, 102 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 653, 
679 (2012) (“[T]he Supreme Court has made judicial policing of the line between 
criminal and civil statutes more difficult by building a wall of deference around the 
legislative decision to call a statute civil rather than criminal.”); Christopher Moseng, 
Iowa’s Sex Offender Residency Restrictions: How the Judicial Definition of Punishment Leads 
Policy Makers Astray, 11 J. GENDER RACE & JUST. 125, 135 (2007) (“The hallmark of the 
Smith doctrine and the Mendoza-Martinez factors is legislative deference.”); Mark 
Loudon-Brown, “They Set Him on a Path Where He’s Bound to Get Ill”: Why Sex Offender 
Residency Restrictions Should be Abandoned, 62 N.Y.U. ANN. SURV. AM. L. 795, 820–28 
(2007) (describing the Supreme Court’s view of what satisfies a rational connection to 
a nonpunitive purpose under Mendoza-Martinez as “very deferential” to the legislature). 
 49  See Logan, supra note 10, at 1276. 
 50  Id. 
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warning of their effect and permit individuals to rely on their meaning 
until explicitly changed.’”51  Second, the Framers feared arbitrary and 
vindictive lawmaking that could target unpopular people.52  Thus, 
critics contend, lawmakers should not have unchecked freedom to 
impose retroactive laws that severely restrict freedom or impose 
oppressive burdens.53 
Second, consideration of the Mendoza-Martinez factors is highly 
subjective and potentially leads to results that undermine public 
confidence in the rule of law, “particularly when the rule is designed 
to guarantee fundamental civil liberties.”54  As Professor Aaron 
Fellmeth observes, “[m]ultifactor tests give guidance in extreme 
circumstances . . . but in all other cases, a subjective judgment is merely 
clothed with the legitimacy of an ostensibly reasoned decision.”55 
Adding to this problem is the potential that results-oriented 
judges will manipulate the test to achieve a desired result.56  As one 
state court judge eloquently explained: 
It should come as little surprise then, in the politically 
charged and passionate atmosphere surrounding [residency 
restrictions], that negative findings on these factors are 
afforded great weight by reviewing courts while affirmative 
findings are often glossed over and discounted as 
insignificant in route to upholding the measure’s 
constitutionality.  It is often a process that can be fairly 
criticized as little more than judicial sleight of hand.57 
Third, the Mendoza-Martinez analysis is largely circular.  As 
Fellmeth explains, the analysis “assumes that these factors are a priori 
elements of a concept of criminality whose origin or purpose the Court 
has never sufficiently explained.  The factors named by the Court beg 
the very question they should be answering.”58  For example, “a law 
whose sanction historically has been regarded as punishment is more 
‘criminal’ than a law whose sanction has not been so regarded” under 
Mendoza-Martinez.59  But a finding that a sanction is a historical form of 
 
 51  Id. (quoting Weaver v. Graham, 450 U.S. 24, 28–29 (1981)). 
 52  Id. at 1276–77. 
 53  Catherine L. Carpenter & Amy E. Beverlin, The Evolution of Unconstitutionality in 
Sex Offender Registration Laws, 63 HASTINGS L.J. 1071, 1105 (2012). 
 54  Fellmeth, supra note 48, at 37. 
 55  Id. at 36–37. 
 56  See Smith v. Doe, 538 U.S. 84, 113 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
 57  Commonwealth v. Baker, Nos. 07-M-00604, 06-M-5879, 06-M-5885, 06-M-6031, 
06-M-5834, 06-M-5930, 06-M-5866, at 18–19 (Kenton Cnty. Dist. Ct. Apr. 20, 2007). 
 58  Fellmeth, supra note 48, at 40. 
 59  Id. 
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punishment would resolve the punishment inquiry without the need 
to consider other factors.60 
Because of these problems, some critics have proposed jettisoning 
the Mendoza-Martinez framework altogether.  For example, Fellmeth 
proposes defining as punitive a sanction that has “the systemic effect 
of deterring or punishing a forbidden act,” while defining as non-
punitive a sanction “having the systemic effect of providing 
remediation to a party allegedly injured by an act or omission of the 
defendant” as non-punitive.61  Fellmeth argues that this makes sense 
because “the basic function of civil law is remediation of a past injury, 
while the function of criminal law is deterrence and retribution.”62  
Fellmeth’s definition of punishment would not require deference to 
the legislature; would remove the subjectivity of the Mendoza-Martinez 
framework and replace it with an objective definition of punishment; 
and would replace Mendoza-Martinez’s circular analysis with a more 
straightforward and principled way to distinguish punitive from 
remedial measures.  Under Fellmeth’s approach, residency restrictions 
would be found punitive because they do not remediate a party’s past 
harm yet further deterrence and retribution.63 
Perhaps another approach is the one Justice Stevens advocated 
for in his dissenting opinion in Smith v. Doe.  Stevens defined a sanction 
as punitive if it “(1) is imposed on everyone who commits a criminal 
offense, (2) is not imposed on anyone else, and (3) severely impairs a 
person’s liberty.”64  Like Fellmeth’s proposal, Stevens’s formulation 
does not require courts to defer to legislative intent in determining 
whether a statute has a punitive effect.  Additionally, because the first 
two of Justice Stevens’s proposed factors are objective, the ability of 
courts to manipulate the analysis is reduced.  Moreover, while the third 
factor is subjective—judges could disagree in particular cases about 
how severely a sanction impairs liberty—it would be hard to imagine 
courts concluding that the Iowa residency restriction, for example, 
does not severely impair sex offenders’ liberty. 
But neither of these proposed tests have been adopted by the 
Supreme Court.  Thus, the Mendoza-Martinez analysis, flawed as it may 
be, is the method courts currently use to determine whether a sanction 
 
 60  Id. 
 61  Id. at 41. 
 62  Id. 
 63  See, e.g., Doe v. Miller, 405 F.3d 700, 720 (8th Cir. 2005) (finding that Iowa’s 
residency restriction promotes deterrence and “potentially retributive” goals); 
Mikaloff v. Walsh, No. 5-06-CV-96, 2007 WL 2572268 (N.D. Ohio Sept. 4, 2007). 
 64  Smith v. Doe, 538 U.S. 84, 113 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
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is punitive in effect.  Therefore, rather than argue that Mendoza-
Martinez be abandoned in its entirety in favor of a new theoretical 
framework, this Article will explore a different question: should public 
opinion—whether lay people believe a statute imposes punishment—
be added as a factor for courts to consider under Mendoza-Martinez. 
B. The Mendoza-Martinez Factors and Sex Offenders 
The above-discussed criticisms have particular force in situations 
where courts apply the Mendoza-Martinez framework to determine 
whether restrictions imposed on sex offenders are punitive.  During 
the past twenty years, various measures have been taken to impose 
additional restrictions on sex offenders, from registration and 
community notification requirements65 to civil commitment schemes66 
and residency restrictions.67  The burdens these laws impose are 
unquestionably significant.  But do such laws constitute criminal 
punishment, or are they civil statutes designed to protect the public 
from harm?  The following cases show the difficulty sex offenders face 
when trying to persuade the courts that burdensome laws impose 
punishment. 
1. Kansas v. Hendricks 
Kansas v. Hendricks addressed the question of whether Kansas’s 
civil commitment for sexually violent predators—which the state 
applied retroactively to Leroy Hendricks as he was about to complete 
his prison sentence for taking indecent liberties with two thirteen year-
old boys—violated his rights under the Ex Post Facto and Double 
Jeopardy Clauses of the United States Constitution.68  The statute 
allowed the state to indefinitely commit any sexually violent offender 
whom the state proved, beyond a reasonable doubt, suffered from a 
“mental abnormality” or “personality disorder” that makes it likely that 
the offender is going to engage in future “predatory acts of sexual 
violence.”69 
After determining that the Kansas legislature intended the statute 
to be civil,70 the Court explained how difficult it would be for 
Hendricks—and future litigants—to show that a statute has a punitive 
effect, stating, “we will reject the legislature’s manifest intent only 
 
 65  See, e.g., Smith, 538 U.S. at 84. 
 66  See, e.g., Kansas v. Hendricks, 521 U.S. 346 (1997). 
 67  See, e.g., Miller, 405 F.3d at 700. 
 68  Id. at 353, 356. 
 69  Id. at 352. 
 70  Id. at 361. 
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where a party challenging the statute provides ‘the clearest proof’ that 
‘the statutory scheme [is] so punitive either in purpose or effect as to 
negate [the State’s] intention’ to deem it ‘civil.’”71 
The Court then analyzed several of the Mendoza-Martinez factors 
and concluded that the statute had no punitive effect.72  First, the Court 
concluded that the statute neither furthered retribution73 nor 
deterrence.74  Second, while acknowledging that involuntary civil 
commitment as a sexually violent predator imposed an affirmative 
restraint, the Court dismissed the importance of that factor, stating 
that “‘the mere fact that a person is detained does not inexorably lead 
to the conclusion that the government has imposed punishment.’”75  
Third, comparing the involuntary commitment of sex offenders like 
Hendricks to the involuntary commitment of the dangerously mentally 
ill, the Court characterized the Kansas statute as “a legitimate 
nonpunitive governmental objective and has been historically so 
regarded.”76  Finally, without explicitly stating so, the Court appears to 
have concluded that the statute was not excessive in relation to its non-
punitive purpose, noting that the statute “is only potentially indefinite” 
and that those subject to it would only be confined so long as their 
mental abnormalities made them unable to control their 
dangerousness.77 
 
 71  Id. (quoting United States v. Ward, 448 U.S. 242, 248–49 (1980)). 
 72  Id. at 361–69. 
 73  Hendricks, 521 U.S. at 362 (concluding that the statute did not further the goal 
of retribution because it “does not affix culpability for prior criminal conduct” but 
instead uses “such conduct . . . solely for evidentiary purposes, either to demonstrate 
that a ‘mental abnormality’ exists or to support a finding of future dangerousness”). 
 74  Id. at 362–63 (concluding that because of their mental abnormality or 
personality disorder persons subject to commitment under the statute “are therefore 
unlikely to be deterred by the threat of confinement”). 
 75  Id. at 363 (quoting United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 746 (1987)). 
 76  Id. 
 77  Id. at 364.  The Court also rejected Hendricks’ claims that the statute was 
punitive because it provided for proof beyond a reasonable doubt of dangerousness 
before an offender could be committed, a standard that is applicable in criminal cases, 
and because the treatment was not actually made available to sex offenders committed 
under the act.  The Court dismissed the former, stating that Kansas’ decision to 
provide greater procedural protections “does not transform a civil commitment 
proceeding into a criminal prosecution.”  Id. at 364–65.  The Court dismissed 
Hendricks’s lack of treatment argument, “observ[ing] that, under the appropriate 
circumstances and when accompanied by proper procedures, incapacitation may be a 
legitimate end of the civil law.”  Id. at 365–66 (citing Allen v. Illinois, 478 U.S. 364, 373 
(1988)). 
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2. Smith v. Doe 
Six years after Hendricks, the Supreme Court decided Smith v. Doe.78  
There, the Court held that Alaska’s sex offender registration scheme—
which required convicted sex offenders to verify their addresses 
periodically with law enforcement and mandated law enforcement to 
publish the offenders’ names, photographs, addresses, and other 
information on the Internet—did not impose retroactive punishment 
in violation of the Ex Post Facto Clause.79  After concluding that the 
Alaska legislature intended to create a civil, non-punitive scheme,80 the 
Court then addressed the question of whether the statute had a 
punitive effect. 
Noting that the Mendoza-Martinez factors “are neither exhaustive 
nor dispositive”81 and are “useful guideposts,”82 the Court concluded 
that the most relevant of the seven factors to its analysis were whether 
the scheme “has been regarded in our history and traditions as a 
punishment; imposes an affirmative disability or restraint; promotes 
the traditional aims of punishment; has a rational connection to a 
nonpunitive purpose; or is excessive with respect to this purpose.”83 
Addressing whether the scheme “has been regarded in our history 
and traditions as punishment,” the Court rejected the plaintiffs’ 
argument that the statute resembled Colonial Era shaming 
punishments.84  The Court reasoned that colonial shaming 
punishments “involved more than the dissemination of information” 
such as holding “the person up before his fellow citizens for face-to-
face shaming or expel[ing] him from the community,”85 and that 
Alaska’s statute “results not from public display for ridicule and 
shaming but from the dissemination of accurate information about a 
criminal record, most of which is already public.”86 
 
 
 78  538 U.S. 84 (2003). 
 79  Id. at 105–06. 
 80  Id. at 96. 
 81  Id. at 97 (quoting United States v. Ward, 448 U.S. 242, 249 (1980); United 
States. v. One Assortment of 89 Firearms, 465 U.S. 354, 365, n.7 (1984)). 
 82  Id. (quoting Hudson v. United States, 522 U.S. 93, 99 (1997)). 
 83  Id.  Later in the opinion the Court explained that [t]he two remaining Mendoza-
Martinez factors—whether the regulation comes into play only on a finding of scienter 
and whether the behavior to which it applies is already a crime—are of little weight in 
this case.”  According to the Court, the fact that the scheme “applies only to past 
conduct, which was, and is, a crime . . . is a necessary beginning point, for recidivism 
is the statutory concern.”  Id. at 105. 
 84  Smith, 538 U.S. at 98. 
 85  Id. (citations omitted).  
 86  Id. 
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The Court also rejected the argument that the registration 
scheme imposed an affirmative disability or restraint.  Although the 
Court acknowledged that the registration requirements and the 
publishing of registrant’s information on the Internet “may have a 
lasting and painful impact on the convicted sex offender,” it concluded 
that “these consequences flow not from the Act’s registration and 
dissemination provisions, but from the fact of conviction, already a 
matter of public record.”87 
Although the state conceded that Alaska’s scheme promoted 
deterrence, the Court concluded that the existence of deterrence 
“proves too much”88 and that “[t]o hold that the mere presence of a 
deterrent purpose renders such sanctions ‘criminal’ . . . would severely 
undermine the Government’s ability to engage in effective 
regulation.”89  Moreover, although the Ninth Circuit concluded that 
the statute was retributive because the length of the reporting 
requirement appeared tied to the extent of wrongdoing and not the 
risk of harm posed, the Supreme Court disagreed, reasoning that the 
“broad categories . . . and the corresponding length of the reporting 
requirement . . . are reasonably related to the danger of recidivism, 
and this is consistent with the regulatory objective.”90 
The Court then discussed the statute’s rational relationship to a 
nonpunitive purpose, which it noted “is a ‘[m]ost significant’ factor in 
our determination that the statute’s effects are not punitive.”91  
Addressing the sex offenders’ argument that the statute was not 
narrowly drawn and therefore lacked the necessary connection to a 
nonpunitive purpose, the Court concluded that “[a] statute is not 
deemed punitive simply because it lacks a close or perfect fit with the 
nonpunitive aims it seeks to advance.”92 
Finally the Court disagreed with the Ninth Circuit’s finding that 
the statute was excessive because it applied to all convicted sex 
offenders regardless of their future dangerousness and did not limit 
the number of people who had access to the registry information.  With 
respect to the first point, the Court explained that “the Ex Post Facto 
Clause does not preclude a State from making reasonable categorical 
judgments that conviction of specified crimes should entail particular 
 
 87  Id. at 101. 
 88  Id. at 102. 
 89  Id. (quoting Hudson v. United States, 522 U.S. 93, 105 (1997)). 
 90  Smith, 538 U.S. at 102. 
 91  Id. (quoting United States v. Usury, 518 U.S. 267, 290 (1996)). 
 92  Id. at 103. 
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regulatory consequences.”93  Regarding the second point, the Court 
characterized the notification system as “a passive one,” meaning that 
“[a]n individual must seek access to the information.”94  In reaching its 
conclusion that the statute is not excessive, the Court accepted as 
gospel the “grave concerns over the high rate of recidivism among 
convicted sex offenders and their dangerousness as a class,”95 a risk the 
Court characterized as “frightening and high,”96 and noted that “[t]he 
excessiveness inquiry of our ex post facto jurisprudence is not an 
exercise in determining whether the legislature has made the best 
choice possible to address the problem it seeks to remedy.”97 
Accordingly, in light of its analysis of the Mendoza-Martinez factors, 
the Court concluded that those challenging the Alaska statute “cannot 
show, much less by the clearest proof, that the effects of the law negate 
Alaska’s intention to establish a civil regulatory scheme.”98  As set forth 
below, Smith v. Doe would prove to be a harbinger of bad news for sex 
offenders in Iowa and other parts of the country seeking to challenge 
retroactive application of sex offender residency restrictions on Ex Post 
Facto grounds. 
3. Doe v. Miller 
Three convicted sex offenders filed suit in Iowa District Court on 
behalf of themselves and the class of similarly situated offenders 
affected by Iowa’s sex offender residency restriction.99  Iowa’s statute 
forbids sex offenders from living within 2,000 feet of schools and 
daycare facilities.100  The statute has no time limitation and thus applies 
for an offender’s entire life.101  However, the statute does contain a 
limited grandfather provision, exempting offenders who had 
established their residence before the statute’s effective date.102 
The plaintiffs alleged that the statute violated a number of their 
constitutional rights, including their right under the Ex Post Facto 
Clause not to be punished retroactively.103  With respect to the Ex Post 
Facto challenge, the district court applied the two-prong intents-effect 
 
 93  Id. 
 94  Id. at 105. 
 95  Id. at 103. 
 96  Smith, 538 U.S. at 103 (quoting McKune v. Lile, 536 U.S. 24, 34 (2002)). 
 97  Id. at 105. 
 98  Id. 
 99  See Doe v. Miller, 298 F. Supp.2d 844 (S.D. Iowa 2004). 
 100  Id. at 847 (citing IOWA CODE § 692A.2A (2004)). 
 101  Id. at 849. 
 102  Id. (citing IOWA CODE § 692A.2A (4)(c) (2004)). 
 103  Id. at 847. 
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test to determine whether the Iowa statute imposed punishment.104  
After determining that the legislature intended to create “a civil, non-
punitive scheme to protect the public,” the district court then 
addressed whether the effect of the statute was nonetheless punitive 
under the modified version of the Mendoza-Martinez test applied in 
Smith v. Doe.105 
Regarding the first factor—whether the residency restriction has 
historically been regarded as punishment—the district court 
concluded that the statute bore “striking similarities” to banishment 
given the evidence that “sex offenders are completely banished from 
living in a number of Iowa’s smaller towns and cities” and are 
“relegated to living in industrial areas in some of the cities’ most 
expensive developments, or on the very outskirts of town where 
available housing is very limited.”106  In light of these findings, the 
district court concluded that this first factor pointed towards the Iowa 
residency restriction being punitive.107 
Turning to the second factor—whether the statute imposed an 
affirmative disability or restraint—the court concluded that the 
burden imposed by the statute was “neither minor nor indirect” and 
led to “substantial housing disadvantages” for sex offenders subject to 
its provisions.108  Thus, the second factor also suggested that the statute 
is punitive because Iowa’s residency restriction imposed an affirmative 
disability or restraint.109 
The district court also concluded that the third factor—whether 
the statute promoted the traditional aims of punishment—also 
indicated the statute’s punitive nature because the statute furthered 
both deterrence and retribution.110  With regard to the latter, the court 
concluded that the statute promoted retribution because it applied to 
sex offenders regardless of their dangerousness.111 
With regard to the fourth factor—whether the residency 
restriction was rationally related to a non-punitive purpose—the 
district court concluded that “[t]here is no doubt” that the statute had 
a purpose other than to punish sex offenders, i.e., to protect the 
 
 104  Miller, 298 F. Supp.2d at 867. 
 105  Id. at 868. 
 106  Id. at 869. 
 107  Id. 
 108  Id. 
 109  Id. at 870. 
 110  Miller, 298 F. Supp.2d  at 870. 
 111  Id. 
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public.112  But the district court also concluded that under the fifth 
factor, the Iowa statute was excessive in relation to its non-punitive 
purpose because it applied to offenders who were not dangerous.113 
The Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed.114  The court agreed 
that the legislature’s intent was not punitive, and then turned to the 
question of whether plaintiffs-appellees had demonstrated, by the 
clearest proof, that the effect of the residency restriction was 
punitive.115 
First, the Eighth Circuit rejected the district court’s conclusion 
that Iowa’s statute was analogous to banishment.  The Eighth Circuit 
declined to find that the Iowa statute sufficiently resembled 
banishment because the statute “restricts only where offenders may 
reside” and does not “‘expel’ the offenders from the community,” 
adopting what one commentator has called a per se approach to the 
issue of what constitutes banishment.116 
Second, while the Eighth Circuit acknowledged that the statute 
could have a deterrent effect, it disagreed that such effect meant that 
the restriction is punishment, noting “that the Supreme Court has 
cautioned that this factor not be over-emphasized, for it can ‘prove[] 
too much,’ as ‘[a]ny number of governmental programs might deter 
crime without imposing punishment.’”117  Finding that Iowa’s residency 
restriction “is at least potentially retributive in effect,” the court 
concluded that the statute, “like the registration requirement in Smith 
v. Doe, is consistent with the legislature’s regulatory objective of 
protecting the health and safety of children.”118 
The court also brushed aside the issue of whether the statute 
imposed an affirmative disability or restraint.  After acknowledging 
that the statute did impose an affirmative disability or restraint, the 
court, quoting Smith v. Doe, concluded that the imposition of such a 
burden did not “‘inexorably lead to the conclusion that the 
government has imposed punishment,’”119 reasoning that this factor 
“ultimately points us to the importance of the next inquiry: whether 
the law is rationally connected to a non-punitive purpose, and whether 
 
 112  Id. 
 113  Id. at 871. 
 114  Doe v. Miller, 405 F.3d 700 (8th Cir. 2005). 
 115  Id. at 718. 
 116  Id. at 719. 
 117  Id. at 720 (quoting Smith v. Doe, 538 U.S. 84, 102 (2003)). 
 118  Id. 
 119  Id. at 721 (quoting Kansas v. Hendricks, 521 U.S. 346, 363 (1997)). 
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it is excessive in relation to that purpose.”120 
Stating that the rational-connection prong is “the ‘most significant 
factor’ in the Ex Post Facto analysis,”121 the Eighth Circuit agreed with 
the district court that the statute is rationally related to protecting 
children “[i]n light of the high risk of recidivism posed by sex 
offenders.”122  But the Eight Circuit parted ways with the district court 
over whether the statute was excessive in relation to its non-punitive 
purpose.  In overruling the district court on that point, the Eight 
Circuit concluded that the “‘excessive’ prong of the ex post facto 
analysis does not require a ‘close or perfect’ fit between the 
legislature’s non-punitive purpose and the corresponding 
regulation.”123  The Eighth Circuit also concluded that the absence of 
scientific evidence that the 2,000-foot restriction protects children did 
not render the law excessive because the distance the legislature chose 
was a reasonable policy choice.124  Thus, the Eighth Circuit concluded 
that Iowa’s residency restriction did not impose punishment.125 
 
 
 
 120  Miller, 405 F.3d at 721. 
 121  Id. (emphasis added) (quoting Smith, 538 U.S. at 102).  Note that the Supreme 
Court in Smith stated that the statute’s rational relationship to a non-punitive purpose 
was “a most significant factor,” not the most significant one as the Eighth Circuit states.  
Smith, 538 U.S. at 102. 
 122  Id. (citing Smith, 538 U.S. at 103). 
 123  Id. at 722. 
 124  Id. 
 125  Id. at 723.  The Eighth Circuit’s decision was not unanimous.  The dissent 
disagreed with the majority’s analysis of whether the statute should be regarded in our 
history and traditions as punishment, concluding that the statute “sufficiently 
resembles banishment to make this factor weigh towards finding the law punitive.”  Id. 
at 724 (Melloy, J., dissenting).  The dissent also concluded that the statute promotes 
deterrence and criticized the majority for “attempt[ing] to minimize the deterrent 
effect of the statute.”  Id. at 725 (Melloy, J., dissenting).  Additionally, the dissent found 
that the statute imposed an affirmative disability or restraint, and distinguished the 
residency restriction from the registration scheme at issue in Smith.  Id. (Melloy, J., 
dissenting).  Although the dissent agreed that the statute is related to a non-punitive 
purpose, it took issue with the majority’s conclusion that the restriction was not 
excessive in relation to its non-punitive purpose.  Id. (Melloy, J., dissenting).  Key to 
the dissent’s reasoning on this last factor was the fact that the Iowa statute “limits the 
housing choices of all offenders identically, regardless of their type of crime, type of 
victim or risk of re-offending.  The effect is quite dramatic: Many offenders cannot live 
with their families and/or cannot live in their home communities because the whole 
community is a restricted area.”  Id. (Melloy, J., dissenting).  In concluding that the 
statute imposed punishment, the dissent concluded that four of the five factors weigh 
in favor of finding the statute punitive.  Id. at 726 (Melloy, J., dissenting). 
SINGLETON (DO NOT DELETE) 4/12/2015  9:39 PM 
2015] WHAT IS PUNISHMENT? 453 
4. Were Hendricks, Smith, and Miller correctly decided? 
Were these three cases correctly decided?  Did the courts in 
Hendricks, Smith, and Miller strike the appropriate balance between 
safeguarding citizens against retroactive punishment and upholding 
the right of the state to enact civil legislation intended to protect the 
public? 
The answers to these questions are far from obvious and depend, 
in part, upon whether one accepts that the danger sex offenders pose 
is so great as to justify severe restrictions on their liberty that might 
otherwise be called punishment if applied to someone else.  In this 
regard, both the Supreme Court and the Eighth Circuit Court of 
Appeals believed that sex offenders, as a group, are likely to recidivate 
and therefore pose a serious threat to public safety.126 
In reality, the vast majority of sex offenders are not like Leroy 
Hendricks.  Some commit offenses many in the community would 
consider “non serious.”127  Many, regardless of the type of sex crime 
committed, have a low risk of reoffending.128  Most never commit 
another sexual offense.129  For example, a United States Department of 
Justice study reported that 5.3 percent of sex offenders were rearrested 
for a new sex crime within three years after release from prison.130  The 
Ohio Department of Rehabilitation and Correction found that 11 
percent of sex offenders return to prison for a new sexual offense or a 
sexually related parole violation, such as possession of pornography, 
within ten years of release from incarceration.131  Additionally, 
Canadian researchers who studied 29,000 sex offenders in North 
America and Europe reported a 14 percent recidivism rate.132  While it 
is true that some child molesters may recidivate at higher rates than 
 
 126  See Smith v. Doe, 538 U.S. 84, 103 (2003); Miller, 405 F.3d at 721. 
 127  David A. Singleton, Kids, Cops and Sex Offenders, 57 HOW. L.J. 353, 386 (2013) 
(referring to “Romeo and Juliet” offenses involving consensual sexual acts between 
teens). 
 128  Id. 
 129  Id. 
 130  BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, RECIDIVISM OF SEX OFFENDERS RELEASED FROM 
PRISON IN 1994, at 24 (2003). 
 131  OHIO DEP’T OF REHAB. & CORR., TEN-YEAR RECIDIVISM FOLLOW-UP OF 1989 SEX 
OFFENDER RELEASES 12, 24 (Apr. 2001), available at http://www.drc.state.oh.us/web 
/reports/ten_year_recidivism.pdf.  
 132  See R. Karl Hanson & Monique T. Bussiere, Predicting Relapse: A Meta-Analysis of 
Sexual Offender Recidivism Studies, 66 J. CONSULTING & CLINICAL PSYCHOL. 348–62 (1998); 
R. Karl Hanson & Kelly Morton-Bourgon, Predictors of Sexual Recidivism: An Updated 
Meta-Analysis (2004), available at http://www.static99.org/pdfdocs/hansonand 
mortonbourgon2004.pdf. 
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sex offenders who have victimized adults,133 the widespread belief that 
all sex offenders will reoffend is contradicted by the available social 
science research. 
However, regardless of whether Hendricks, Smith, and Miller were 
correctly decided, the Mendoza-Martinez framework, as discussed above, 
is flawed.  The next part will explore whether including public opinion 
as a factor for courts to consider would improve punishment 
determinations under Mendoza-Martinez. 
II. INCORPORATING PUBLIC OPINION INTO THE MENDOZA-MARTINEZ 
FRAMEWORK 
As discussed above, Mendoza-Martinez set forth a list of factors for 
courts to consider when determining whether or not a government 
sanction imposes punishment.134  The Supreme Court has made clear 
that the Mendoza-Martinez factors are “non-exhaustive.”135  However, no 
court has considered additional factors under Mendoza-Martinez.  
Perhaps lower courts and advocates believe the list of Mendoza-Martinez 
factors to be fixed unless and until the Supreme Court says otherwise.  
But lower courts need not wait for the Supreme Court to consider 
other factors. 
Given that the Supreme Court has left the door open for courts 
to articulate and analyze other relevant factors, should courts take into 
account public opinion in determining whether a statute has a punitive 
effect?  Would public opinion evidence help delineate the boundary 
between civil regulation and criminal punishment?  Would 
consideration of public opinion as part of the Mendoza-Martinez analysis 
 
 133  Compare Hanson & Bussiere, supra note 132, at 351 (reporting 20 percent 
recidivism rate for child molesters), with Robert A. Prentky, Austin F.S. Lee, Raymond 
A. Knight & David Cerce, Recidivism Rates Among Child Molesters and Rapists: A 
Methodological Analysis, 21 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 635 (1997) (Reporting a recidivism risk 
as high as 52 percent for child molesters.  However, relying on the older Prentky study 
to draw conclusions about the recidivism rates of child molesters is unwise.  The 
subjects of Prentky’s study were released from prison between 1959 and 1985, well 
before sex offender treatment became more widely available and effective.  Id. at 640, 
657.  Moreover, Prentky and his colleagues described their subjects as the “worst of the 
worst” offenders, individuals who had been civilly committed for violent and/or repeat 
sexual offenses.  Id. at 637.  In light of these circumstances, Prentky and his colleagues 
issued the following caveats: (1) “[t]he obvious heterogeneity of sexual offenders 
precludes automatic generalization of the rates reported here to other samples,” and 
(2) “these findings should not be construed as evidence of the inefficacy of treatment,” 
since “the treatment services [available to the subjects of the study] were not provided 
uniformly or systematically and did not conform to a state-of-the-art mode.”  Id. at 656–
57 (emphasis in original). 
 134  See supra notes 39–40 and accompanying text. 
 135  Smith v. Doe, 538 U.S. 84, 97 (2003). 
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address any of the framework’s shortcomings discussed in Part I, supra?  
Before answering these questions, it is helpful to address an important 
threshold question: in what contexts are public opinion surveys 
admissible? 
A. The Admissibility of Public Opinion Surveys in Other Contexts 
Generally speaking, public opinion surveys are admissible where 
relevant to a material issue in dispute.136  Despite being hearsay, poll 
evidence is admissible under the state of mind exception if the 
respondent’s state of mind is relevant to a material issue.137  Proponents 
of survey evidence must also demonstrate that the data collected is 
reliable by showing that (1) the researchers examined the proper 
universe; (2) a representative sample was drawn from that universe; (3) 
the mode of questioning was correct; (4) the individuals conducting 
the surveys are experts; (5) the data was accurately reported; and (6) 
the overall methodology in collecting the data was consistent with 
accepted standards of procedure and statistics.138 
Provided these threshold requirements are satisfied, courts have 
admitted public opinion surveys in at least two contexts where such 
evidence has been deemed relevant and helpful.  One of these 
contexts is obscenity cases, where the question is whether alleged 
obscene material violates community standards. 
In Miller v. California,139 the United States Supreme Court 
announced a three-part test for determining whether material is 
obscene.  Under that test, material is unlawfully obscene if “(a) the 
average person applying contemporary community standards would 
find that the work appeals to the prurient interest; (b) the material 
depicts sexual conduct in a patently offensive way; and (c) lacks serious 
literary, artistic, political or scientific value.”140  Since Miller, several 
courts have admitted public opinion poll data on the question of 
whether the material at issue in the case is obscene.  For example, in 
People v. Nelson,141 the Illinois Court of Appeals held that the trial court 
erred in refusing to admit the prosecutor’s survey evidence because 
the survey results showed the degree of public acceptance of the 
 
 136  See Susan J. Becker, Public Opinion Polls and Surveys as Evidence: Suggestions for 
Resolving Confusing and Conflicting Standards Governing Weight and Admissibility, 70 OR. 
L. REV. 463 (1991). 
 137  Id. at 473 (citing the seminal case of Zippo Mfg. Co. v. Rogers Imps., Inc., 216 
F. Supp. 670 (S.D.N.Y. 1963). 
 138  Id. at 483–84 (citing MANUAL FOR COMPLEX LITIGATION 120 (5th ed. 1981)). 
 139  413 U.S. 15 (1973). 
 140  Id. at 24. 
 141  410 N.E.2d 476 (Ill. App. Ct. 1980). 
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material and “may be the only way to prove degrees of acceptability.”142 
An Indiana appellate court reached a similar result, concluding 
that a poll was relevant in determining community standards and its 
acceptance of a particular film.143  The court then articulated a seven-
pronged test for the proponent of such polling data to meet before 
such evidence would be accepted.144  While some courts have rejected 
survey evidence in obscenity cases, they have usually done so because 
the survey itself was somehow flawed.145 
Surveys have also been admitted in trademark infringement cases 
brought under the Lanham Act,146 where the issue is whether a person 
is attempting to “pass off his goods or business as the goods or business 
of another.”147  Specifically, courts have admitted the results of 
consumer polls where the question is whether a trade name or symbol 
is “so confusingly similar” to a preexisting trademark or trade name 
established by a competitor, so long as the survey was properly 
conducted.148  While public recognition surveys are not necessary to 
prove a case of trademark infringement, many courts consider them 
very useful.149  When courts exclude such survey evidence in trademark 
cases, it is usually because the expert surveyed the wrong universe or 
there was some other flaw that undermined reliability.150 
 
 142  Id. at 479. 
 143  Saliba v. State, 475 N.E.2d 1181, 1187 (Ind. Ct. App. 1985). 
 144  Id. at 1187–88 ((1) an expert conducted the survey; (2) the survey examined 
the relevant universe; (3) a representative sample from that universe was surveyed; (4) 
the mode of questioning was valid; (5) the design of the survey met generally accepted 
standards; (6) the expert accurately reported the data gathered; (7) the expert 
analyzed the data in a statistically correct manner). 
 145  See, e.g., St. John v. N.C. Parole Comm’n, 764 F.Supp. 403, 410–11 (W.D.N.C. 
1991) (excluding defense expert testimony about telephone surveys because the 
surveys failed to convey the visual image of the alleged pornographic material that was 
the subject of the case); U.S. v. Pryba, 678 F.Supp. 1225, 1229 (E.D. Va. 1988) (defense 
poll inadmissible because it did not ask questions about the materials at issue in the 
case or other material “clearly akin” to the allegedly obscene material and because the 
poll did not ask whether the charged materials enjoyed community acceptance); 
People v. Thomas, 346 N.E.2d 190, 195 (Ill. App. Ct. 1976) (defense poll excluded 
because defense did not demonstrate methods and circumstances used in conducting 
the survey). 
 146  15 U.S.C. § 1125 (2012). 
 147  Standard Oil v. Standard Oil, 252 F.2d 65, 72 (10th Cir. 1958). 
 148  Id. at 72; see, e.g., First Nat. Bank in Sioux Falls v. First Nat. Bank S.D., 679 F.3d 
763, 770–71 (8th Cir. 2012) (finding survey admissible); Prudential Ins. Co. of America 
v. Gibraltar Fin. Corp. of Cal., 694 F.2d 1150, 1156 (9th Cir. 1982) (“Surveys are 
admissible, if relevant, either as nonhearsay or through a hearsay exception”). 
 149  J. THOMAS MCCARTHY, 6 MCCARTHY ON TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR COMPETITION § 
32:195 (4th ed. 2012). 
 150  See, e.g., Water Pik, Inc., v. Med-Systems, Inc., 726 F.3d 1126, 1145 (10th Cir. 
2013) (stating that the flaw was that the survey’s methodology was unsound); Citizens 
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Finally, although not involving the admission of poll evidence at 
a trial proceeding, the Supreme Court in Atkins v. Virginia151 cited to 
public opinion polls—attached to an amicus brief—in support of its 
holding that the execution of mentally retarded individuals violates the 
Eighth Amendment.152  The Court’s partial reliance on opinion polls 
demonstrates its openness to considering opinion surveys in other 
contexts. 
In sum, a public opinion survey is admissible where relevant to a 
legal issue the judge or jury must decide, provided that the survey is 
conducted in a methodologically sound manner.  So should public 
opinion surveys be deemed relevant in making punishment 
determinations?  The next subpart will argue that such surveys are 
relevant and helpful to drawing the line between criminal punishment 
and civil regulation. 
B. The Relevance of Public Opinion Surveys in the Mendoza-Martinez 
Context 
Proponents of including public opinion as a factor for courts to 
consider under Mendoza-Martinez would likely encounter a relevance 
objection.  Distinguishing obscenity and trademark infringement 
cases—where public opinion surveys are relevant because the legal 
standard requires some assessment or quantification of community 
sentiment—opponents would argue that the definition of punishment 
does not require measurement of community sentiment.  Therefore, 
under the opposition’s argument, what the public thinks about 
whether a statute is punitive is not probative of a material issue the 
court must decide. 
However, public opinion is highly relevant to determining what 
should be considered punitive in today’s times.  Much has changed in 
our criminal justice system since the Founding Era.  When the Framers 
decided to prohibit governments from enacting ex post facto laws, the 
universe of possible punishments consisted of death, banishment, 
whipping, placement in the stockades, branding, and other shaming 
punishments designed to humiliate the offender.153  Today, the 
predominant forms of punishment are imprisonment and probation, 
parole, or other types of post-release supervision.154  But legislatures, 
 
Fin. Grp. vs. Citizens Fin. Bank of Evansville, 383 F.3d 110, 121 (3d Cir 2004). 
 151  536 U.S. 304 (2002). 
 152  Id. at 316 n.21. 
 153  LAWRENCE M. FRIEDMAN, CRIME AND PUNISHMENT IN AMERICAN HISTORY 36–50 
(1993) (describing Colonial Era punishments). 
 154  See id. at 77, 406–07. 
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under the guise of enacting civil, regulatory laws to protect the public, 
have retroactively imposed increasingly severe and oppressive burdens 
on criminal offenders that may seem like punishment to many.155 
Although Mendoza-Martinez asks whether a sanction or burden has 
been “historically regarded in our history and traditions as 
punishment,”156 its analysis of whether the statute should be deemed 
punitive in today’s times is deficient.  True, the remaining Mendoza-
Martinez factors focus on the present, in terms of whether the statute 
currently imposes an affirmative disability or restraint, requires 
scienter, promotes deterrence or retribution, applies to conduct that 
is already a crime, is rationally related to a non-punitive purpose, and 
is excessive in relation to its non-punitive purpose.  But using Mendoza-
Martinez to define what is punitive “produces a misleading and 
impoverished definition of punishment no matter how close the 
question.”157  It does so by allowing courts to dismiss individual factors 
that point towards punition—such as the imposition of an affirmative 
restraint or the promotion of deterrence or retribution—while putting 
great weight on the statute’s connection to a non-punitive purpose.158 
But, if determining whether a statute actually has a punitive effect 
is the goal, then the public’s opinion about whether a statute is 
punitive is relevant and useful to answering that question.  The 
Supreme Court seemed to be making this very point in Smith v. Doe.159  
Addressing the issue of whether Alaska’s registry was an historical form 
of punishment, the Court observed: “A historical survey can be useful 
because a State that decides to punish an individual is likely to select a 
means deemed punitive in our tradition, so that the public will 
recognize it as such.”160  This reasoning applies with equal force to 
conducting present-day surveys of lay people to determine whether 
they recognize government-imposed sanctions as punitive. 
Public opinion is also relevant to the extent it reflects community 
sentiment about the fairness or unfairness of imposing a burden 
retroactively.  As discussed earlier, one of the core purposes of the 
prohibition against ex post facto laws is to safeguard citizens against the 
 
 155  See Catherine L. Carpenter, Legislative Epidemics: A Cautionary Tale of Criminal 
Laws That Have Swept the Country, 58 BUFF. L.R. 1, 52 (2010) (describing the rash of 
burdensome sex offender laws enacted “under the guise of a nonpunitive alternative 
purpose”). 
 156  Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez, 372 U.S. 144, 163 (1963). 
 157  Moseng, supra note 48, at 134. 
 158  See, e.g., Kansas v. Hendricks, 521 U.S. 346, 361–69 (1997); Smith v. Doe, 538 
U.S. 84, 97–105 (2003); Doe v. Miller, 405 F.3d 700, 719–23 (2005). 
 159  538 U.S. 84 (2003). 
 160  Id. at 97. 
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unfairness that results from imposing additional punishment for 
conduct committed under existing law.161 
In addition to being relevant to the punishment inquiry under 
Mendoza-Martinez, consideration of public opinion surveys would 
address some of the concerns critics of the framework have raised.  The 
following subpart explains how public opinion evidence would 
improve punishment determinations. 
C. The Benefits of Considering Public Opinion in Determining 
Punishment Under Mendoza-Martinez 
There are several benefits to allowing courts to consider public 
opinion as a factor under Mendoza-Martinez.  First, to the extent the 
current framework is overly deferential to the legislature, public 
opinion could serve as a significant counterweight to that 
acquiescence.  Although the Mendoza-Martinez framework may “build[] 
a wall of deference around the legislative determination that a statute 
is civil and not criminal,”162 courts do not owe blind deference to the 
legislature.163  The Framers considered the Ex Post Facto prohibition 
one of the most important structural safeguards in a democratic 
society.164  As discussed earlier, the Clause serves two very important 
purposes: (1) ensuring that citizens receive “fair warning” of the 
consequences of wrongful conduct before engaging in it;165 and (2) 
protecting citizens from arbitrary and vindictive lawmaking that, in the 
heat of passion, can be directed at “maligned individuals and groups 
of the moment.”166  Given these underlying purposes, heightened 
scrutiny is warranted of legislative actions that impose oppressive 
 
 161  See Logan, supra note 10, at 1276. 
 162  Stinneford, supra note 48, at 679. 
 163  See Logan, supra note 10, at 1292 (quoting Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 103 
(1958) (“When the Government acts to take away [a] fundamental right . . . the 
safeguards of the Constitution should be examined with special diligence. . . . We 
cannot push back the limits of the Constitution merely to accommodate challenged 
legislation.”)). 
 164  Logan, supra note 10, at 1292. 
 165  Id. at 1276–77. 
 166  Id. at 1277 (quoting James Madison: “[t]he sober people of America are weary 
of the fluctuating policy which has directed the public councils.  They have seen with 
regret and indignation, that sudden changes and legislative interferences . . . become 
jobs in the hands of enterprising and influential speculators . . . .” THE FEDERALIST, NO. 
44, at 351 (James Madison) (Hamilton ed., 1880); and quoting Alexander Hamilton: 
“Nothing is more common than for a free people, in times of heat and violence, to 
gratify momentary passions, by letting into the government principles and precedents 
which afterwards prove fatal to themselves,” JOHN C. HAMILTON, HISTORY OF THE 
REPUBLIC OF THE UNITED STATES 34 (1859)). 
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retroactive burdens.167  But under current law, legislatures can avoid 
serious scrutiny of a statute’s punitive effect by classifying the law as 
civil rather than criminal.168  Surely the Framers did not envision that 
legislatures could so easily thwart the Ex Post Facto Clause’s purpose via 
mere nomenclature. 
Allowing courts to consider public opinion would counterbalance 
the legislative deference Mendoza-Martinez embodies.  Although courts 
must ordinarily defer to the legislature when determining the 
constitutionality of a statute,169 this deference does not require a court 
to abandon its common sense when analyzing a statute’s real world 
impact.  Unlike courts, lay people are not guided by the same 
institutional pressures to show deference to legislative power.170  
Instead, ordinary citizens would define punishment using their 
common sense and life experience, which would bring a real world, as 
opposed to a legalistic, perspective to punishment determinations.  
Rather than breaking the definition of punishment into discrete 
factors which courts can easily manipulate by elevating the importance 
of some factors while downplaying the significance of others,171 lay 
people would likely define the concept more holistically and with an 
eye towards what is obviously punitive as a matter of common sense 
and life experience.172 
Put simply, public opinion evidence would add common sense to 
the Mendoza-Martinez analysis.  Assuming sound survey methodology, 
public opinion results could constitute very powerful and persuasive 
evidence of what is, or is not, punishment, making it more difficult for 
courts to gloss over the Mendoza-Martinez factors that point to a statute’s 
punition, and forcing courts to render more intellectually honest 
 
 167  Id. 
 168  Fellmeth, supra note 48, at 36; Logan, supra note 10, at 1287. 
 169  Kansas v. Hendricks, 521 U.S. 346, 361 (1997); Fellmeth, supra note 48, at 36; 
Logan, supra note 10, at 1287. 
 170  See Douglas A. Berman, Making the Framers’ Case, and a Modern Case, for Jury 
Involvement in Habeas Adjudication, 71 OHIO ST. L.J. 781, 814 (2010): 
[W]here a habeas jury is called upon to review the factual sufficiency of 
the evidence that resulted in a jury conviction at the trial court, their 
fresh and thorough review should not push up against the same kinds of 
institutional pressures to show deference to their predecessors that 
results when judges are the central and sole habeas adjudicators. 
 171  Smith v. Doe, 538 U.S. 84, 113 (2003) (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
 172  See Taylor Whitten, Under the Guise of Reform: How Marijuana Possession Is Exposing 
the Flaws in the Criminal Justice System’s Guarantee of a Right to a Jury Trial, 99 IOWA L. REV. 
919, 929 (2014) (describing a jury as providing an “additional safeguard of community 
common sense”); Katelyn E. Keegan, The True Man & The Battered Woman: Prospects for 
Gender Neutral Narratives in Self-Defense Doctrines, 65 HASTINGS L.J. 259, 281 (2013) 
(discussing how juries “apply common sense and their own life experiences”). 
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decisions about what does, and does not, constitute punishment. 
Additionally, allowing public opinion evidence to be considered 
under Mendoza-Martinez may help courts make more informed 
punishment determinations.  As some scholars have observed, judges 
are not particularly representative of the general population,173 and 
thus may be limited by their particular world view in ascertaining the 
meaning and significance of certain facts.  Specifically, “[j]udges are 
more predominantly male, white, and wealthy than the body politic as 
a whole.”174  Accordingly, it is not hard to imagine how a judge’s life 
experience and values175 could impact her decision on whether a 
sanction is punitive in effect. 
For example, a wealthy judge could subconsciously downplay the 
severity of residency restrictions because, in his or her experience, 
there are plenty of housing options available, albeit expensive ones.  
How exactly these biases play out in decisions is speculative.  Judges 
who come from wealthy backgrounds are not incapable of 
appreciating the obstacles that less fortunate people face; and the fact 
that a judge grew up poor does not mean that he or she will be sensitive 
to the plight of indigent sex offenders.  But given the likelihood that a 
judge’s life experience and values affect her decision making,176 
allowing courts to consider public opinion in determining what is, or 
is not, punitive, may help the judge see around his or her blind spots. 
D. Other Objections to Considering Public Opinion under Mendoza-
Martinez 
As discussed above, establishing the relevance of public opinion 
evidence and the reliability of the process used to generate the results 
would be the primary hurdles to introducing such evidence under 
Mendoza-Martinez.  But other potential objections to considering public 
opinion surveys exist.  The following subparts will briefly address three 
additional concerns. 
 
 
 
 
 173  See Meghan J. Ryan, The Missing Jury: The Neglected Role of Juries in Eighth 
Amendment Punishment Clause Determinations, 64 FLA. L. REV. 549, 582 (2012); see also 
Henry S. Gerla, The Reasonableness Standard in the Law of Negligence: Can Abstract Values 
Receive Their Due, 15 U. DAYTON L. REV. 199, 223 (1990). 
 174  Gerla, supra note 173, at 223. 
 175  See Donald M. Kahan & Donald Braman, Cultural Cognition and Public Policy, 24 
YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 149 (2006) (discussing how values affect judicial decision 
making). 
 176  See id. 
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1. Members of the Public Are No Better Than Judges at 
Objectively Determining What Constitutes Punishment 
The foregoing discussion assumes that ordinary people would be 
more objective and honest in assessing whether a statute has a punitive 
effect.  But is that necessarily the case?  For example, given that sex 
offenders are the pariahs of our times,177 would members of the public 
honestly answer the question of whether a statute is punitive if they 
knew that an affirmative answer would mean that the statute could not 
apply retroactively? 
The answer depends on whether survey respondents would be 
aware of the legal significance of a sanction being deemed punitive.  If 
respondents know that the survey is being prepared for litigation and 
that the government could be barred from enforcing the law 
retroactively if public opinion indicates the sanction is punitive, then 
respondents who fear sex offenders could be motivated to give a 
results-oriented answer (i.e., that the statute does not impose 
punishment).  The way to manage this concern is simple: refrain from 
informing the respondents of the legal significance of a statute being 
found punitive.  Simply asking whether the statute imposes 
punishment would elicit a common sense response without increasing 
the risk of a dishonest, results-oriented answer. 
2. Consideration of Public Opinion Evidence Could 
Create an Inconsistent Body of Case Law 
One potential argument against allowing public opinion to be 
considered under Mendoza-Martinez is that courts could decide the 
punishment question differently based on whether or not public 
opinion surveys were admitted.  Thus, permitting public opinion 
evidence to be considered under Mendoza-Martinez would undermine 
one of the virtues of the framework: the existing factors can be 
analyzed in every case without the need to introduce outside 
evidence.178 
 
 177  See supra note 15 and accompanying text. 
 178  Litigants are able to present evidence relevant to the seven Mendoza-Martinez 
factors.  See, e.g., Doe v. Miller, 298 F. Supp. 2d 844, 850–65 (S.D. Iowa 2004) 
(describing testimony from experts and lay witnesses regarding Iowa’s sex offender 
residency restriction). 
Courts can examine the factors in every case where they are relevant, regardless of 
whether the litigants present evidence with respect to each factor.  Specifically, the 
first, third, and fifth factors—whether the statute imposes an affirmative disability or 
restraint; whether a finding of scienter is necessary for the statute to apply; and 
whether the conduct to which it applies is already a crime—can be answered by simply 
reading the statute.  The second factor—whether the statutory sanction or burden has 
SINGLETON (DO NOT DELETE) 4/12/2015  9:39 PM 
2015] WHAT IS PUNISHMENT? 463 
Survey results are an altogether different matter.  If survey results 
are allowed under Mendoza-Martinez, it is unlikely they would be 
introduced in every case.  Retaining experts to conduct 
methodologically sound polls could be expensive and beyond the 
means of many litigants.179  Thus, courts could potentially rule 
differently based on whether or not it considered survey evidence, 
resulting in an inconsistent body of case law. 
Addressing this objection is straightforward.  While it is true that 
public opinion surveys would not be offered in every punishment 
determination case, it would be appropriate for courts to consider such 
evidence where it is available.  As mentioned earlier, Mendoza-Martinez 
sets forth a list of non-exhaustive factors for courts to consider in 
determining what constitutes punishment.180  The fact that the list is 
non-exhaustive means that courts can consider other relevant factors.  
Thus, courts have authority under Mendoza-Martinez to consider 
additional factors that are relevant to whether a statute has a punitive 
effect. 
The fact that some litigants may lack resources to commission a 
public opinion survey should not prohibit those who have the means 
to do so.  If that were the rule, then plaintiffs like those in Doe v. Miller 
would not be allowed to call experts that other litigants might lack the 
resources to retain. 
 
historically been regarded as punishment—simply requires courts to compare the 
statutory sanction at issue with historical forms of punishment. 
The fourth factor—whether the statute promotes the traditional aims of punishment: 
deterrence and retribution—similarly does not require the presentation of evidence.  
The deterrence question requires the court to assess the impact of the statute on an 
offender and how that impact could deter others from committing crime.  See State v. 
Cook, 700 N.E.2d 570, 583 (Ohio 1998) ( “Deterrent measures serve as a threat of 
negative repercussions to discourage people from engaging in certain behavior.”).  
Determining whether the statute promotes retribution requires the court to determine 
whether the statute affects future conduct or is instead “vengeance for its own sake.”  
Id. 
The sixth factor—whether the statute is rationally connected to a nonpunitive 
purpose—is “not demanding” and is satisfied so long as the statute has a purpose other 
than to punish, even if “it lacks a close or perfect fit with the nonpunitive aims it seeks 
to advance.”  Doe v. Miller, 405 F.3d 700, 721 (2005) (citing Smith v. Doe, 538 U.S. 84, 
103 (2003)).  Finally, the seventh factor—whether the statutory sanction is excessive 
in relation to its nonpunitive purpose—is similarly non-demanding and requires the 
court to do nothing more than determine whether the sanction is “reasonably related” 
to the statute’s regulatory purpose.  Miller, 405 F.3d at 723. 
 179  Joseph T. Clark,  The “Community Standard” in the Trial of Obscenity Cases—A 
Mandate for Empirical Evidence in Search of the Truth, 20 OHIO N.U. L. REV. 13, 20 (1993) 
(discussing costs of conducting surveys in obscenity cases). 
 180  Smith v. Doe, 538 U.S. 84, 97 (2003); Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez, 372 U.S. 
144, 168–69 (1963). 
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Finally, courts could also consider relevant public opinion surveys 
introduced in other reported cases.  This could mitigate the concern 
that allowing polls in some cases but not others could result in 
inconsistent case law. 
3. Determining the Significance of Survey Results Would 
Add Another Element of Subjectivity and Arbitrariness 
to the Mendoza-Martinez Analysis 
Suppose that 51 percent of the public believes that the post-
release civil commitment of sex offenders imposes additional 
punishment.  Is that sufficient for a court to conclude that this factor 
points sufficiently towards the statute’s punition, or is a greater 
percentage required?  This question identifies a further potential 
problem with allowing courts to consider public opinion under 
Mendoza-Martinez: determining the meaning of the survey results.  
Answering this question could add yet another element of subjectivity 
and arbitrariness to the Mendoza-Martinez analysis. 
However, courts should have no problem deciding what public 
opinion surveys mean.  For guidance, courts can look to other cases 
where public opinion evidence is regularly considered.  For example, 
in obscenity cases, courts have held surveys to be relevant where the 
results show that a majority of respondents believed that depictions of 
nudity and sexual activity were acceptable under community 
standards.181  Additionally, in trademark infringement cases “[s]urvey 
percentages demonstrating confusion levels over 50% are always 
viewed by courts as persuasive evidence of likely confusion.”182  
Accordingly, it would make sense for courts to conclude that public 
 
 181  See, e.g., People v. Nelson, 410 N.E. 2d. 476, 478–79 (Ill. App. Ct. 1980); Clark, 
supra note 179 (1993) (“[B]efore one can say that contemporary community standards 
have been established, an empirical study of the community should be done to 
determine whether the majority of the community truly believes a publication is 
obscene.”). 
 182  Steak Umm Co., L.L.C. v. Steak ‘Em Up, Inc., 868 F. Supp. 2d 415, 434 (E.D. 
Pa. 2012) (citing Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Johnson, 219 F.2d 590 (3d Cir.1955)).  
However, percentages much less than 50 percent have supported findings of a 
likelihood of confusion in trademark cases.  Steak Umm, 868 F. Supp. 2d at 434.  This 
does not mean that punition should be found in cases where less than a majority of 
respondents believes that a statute imposes punishment.  In trademark infringement 
suits, plaintiffs need not establish that a majority of survey respondents have been 
misled, only that an appreciable number are confused by the competitor’s trade 
symbol.  See J. THOMAS MCCARTHY, 6 MCCARTHY ON TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR 
COMPETITION § 32:185 (4th ed. 2012). (“Likelihood of confusion is found by such a 
likelihood among a ‘substantial’ or ‘appreciable’ number of reasonably prudent 
customers.  An ‘appreciable’ number is not necessarily a majority, and in fact can be 
much less than a majority.” (citations omitted)). 
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opinion results indicate punition where at least a majority of 
respondents so believe. 
E.  Conclusion 
In sum, provided their methodologies are sound, public opinion 
surveys would be relevant, admissible, and helpful in determining what 
constitutes punishment under Mendoza-Martinez.  Such evidence would 
likely help judges understand the real world impact of the sanction at 
issue.  Survey results showing that at least a majority of respondents 
believe the statute imposes punishment should be enough for courts 
to conclude that the survey results weigh in favor of finding the statute 
punitive. 
 III. DECONSTRUCTING A PUBLIC OPINION STUDY 
Up until this point, the discussion has focused on the more 
abstract question of whether consideration of public opinion polls 
under Mendoza-Martinez is appropriate.  The focus will now shift to an 
illustrative case study. 
In 2012, I, along with two social science researchers, published an 
exploratory inquiry assessing the extent to which the public views 
residency restrictions for sex offenders and drunk drivers as punitive.183  
The motivation for conducting the study was my deep dissatisfaction 
with how courts determine punishment under Mendoza-Martinez in 
cases involving sex offenders.  I was particularly disturbed by the ease 
with which courts gloss over factors that point to punishment in an 
apparent attempt to do whatever it took to conclude that the statute at 
issue did not impose punishment.  Therefore, I was eager to learn 
whether community members, using their common sense, would agree 
that residency restrictions were not punitive. 
Although the study has shortcomings that would likely preclude 
its admission in litigation, it nonetheless offers some insight into how 
studies of this kind can be useful to courts in determining whether a 
statute has a punitive effect. 
A. The Study 
The authors sought to “determine whether views about residence 
restrictions were sex offender specific, or rather, indicate a general 
level of punitiveness.”184  Although no state or local laws forbid 
convicted drunk drivers from living near places that sell alcohol, the 
 
 183  Levenson et al., supra note 32. 
 184  Id. at 141. 
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authors tested respondents’ views about whether such restrictions 
would be punitive as applied to convicted DUI offenders to learn 
whether the nature of the crime influenced the perception of whether 
the residence restriction would be punitive.185  The authors 
hypothesized that residence restrictions for sex offenders would be 
viewed as less punitive than for drunk drivers.  The authors believed 
this in part because a substantial proportion of the public drinks and 
drives and would likely view restrictions on where they could live if 
convicted of a DUI offense as harsh and punitive.186 
Research assistants recruited a total of 255 people in Hamilton 
County, Ohio to participate in the study.187  The average age of the 
sample was thirty-seven, and gender was roughly evenly split.188  Fifty-
five percent of the respondents were white and 35 percent were black, 
with the remainder being Asian, Hispanic, or Native American.189  
Eleven percent of the respondents completed high school, 35 percent 
had “some college” education, and 48 percent had completed an 
undergraduate or graduate degree.190  Approximately 40 percent of the 
respondents earned less than $25,000 a year; 29 percent earned 
between $25,000 and $50,000 a year, and 30 percent earned more than 
$50,000 a year.191  Thirty-six percent of the respondents were currently 
married, and 51 percent had never married.192  Fifty-one percent of the 
respondents were parents with an average of 1.4 children.193  Thirty-
seven  percent reported having minor children living in their homes.194  
The sample “appear[ed] to be representative of the population [of 
Hamilton County, Ohio], though African Americans were slightly 
overrepresented.”195 
Research assistants approached the respondents in public places 
and asked them to spend a few minutes of their time reading two brief 
scenarios and answering questions pertaining to those scenarios.196  
The assistants were trained to conduct the interviews without 
suggesting how the respondents should answer and were provided with 
 
 185  Id. 
 186  Id. 
 187  Id. 
 188  Id. 
 189  Levenson et al., supra note 32, at 141. 
 190  Id. 
 191  Id. 
 192  Id. 
 193  Id. 
 194  Id. 
 195  Levenson et al., supra note 32, at 142. 
 196  Id. 
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a script to follow at the beginning of each session.197  They collected 
data at different times of the day and on different days of the week in 
order to diversify the pool of participants.198 
Research assistants gave each respondent a questionnaire 
consisting of two scenarios: one depicting an adult female convicted of 
a DUI offense, the other describing a young man who was convicted of 
a sexual offense as a result of having “consensual” sex with a 
teenager.199  In order to determine whether any bias might occur 
depending on which scenario the respondent read first, half of the 
respondents were given the sex offender scenario first, and the other 
half were given the DUI scenario first.200  Each offender, as a result of 
his or her conviction, was subject to a residency restriction, prohibiting 
him or her from living within 1,000 feet of places that sell alcohol or 
1,000 feet of schools, respective to the offense.201 
A series of five statements followed each scenario.  These 
statements followed the sex offender scenario: 
1. Making the sex offender leave his home imposes  
 additional  punishment on him. 
2. Prohibiting the sex offender from moving to a new 
 address within 1,000 feet of a school imposes additional 
 punishment. 
3.  I believe that most sex offenders will reoffend. 
4.  I believe that residential restrictions for convicted sex 
 offenders are effective in reducing crime. 
5. I believe that laws designed to protect citizens from sex 
 crimes should be enforced even if there is no scientific 
 evidence that they are effective.202 
Identical questions followed the DUI scenario, substituting 
appropriate terms (e.g., “DUI offender” for “sex offender” and “place 
that sells alcohol” for “school”).203  Respondents were asked to rate 
their agreement with each statement on a Likert-type scale of 1 to 5 
(“strongly disagree” to “strongly agree”).204 
The study examined two dependent variables.  The variable leave 
home, mentioned in question one above, “refers to the belief that 
making an offender leave his or her home due to residence restrictions 
 
 197  Id. 
 198  Id. 
 199  Id. at 142, app. 2 at 152–53. 
 200  Id. at 145. 
 201  Levenson et al., supra note 32, app. 2 at 152–53. 
 202  Id. at 144 tbl.2. 
 203  Id. 
 204  Id. at 142. 
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is a form of punishment.”205  The variable prohibit move, mentioned in 
question two above, “refers to the belief that prohibiting an offender 
from moving to a new address within 1,000 feet of a school or place 
that sells alcohol is a form of punishment.”206 
Significantly, the questionnaire neither defined “punishment” 
nor asked respondents to consider and weigh the Mendoza-Martinez 
factors in an attempt to determine whether residency restrictions are 
punitive.  Instead, the questionnaire left it to respondents to decide 
whether residency restrictions impose punishment using their life 
experience, background, and common sense.  Though the study does 
not explicitly say so, the decision not to define punishment was 
intentional.  The study’s point was to explore whether residency 
restrictions are punitive in the ordinary sense of the word. 
In addition to the two dependent variables discussed above, the 
study examined three independent variables to explore how 
respondents viewed crime and crime policy.207  The variable reoffend, 
mentioned in question three above, measured whether respondents 
believed that the offenders described in the two scenarios would 
recidivate.208  The variable effective, mentioned in question four above, 
assessed whether respondents believed that residency restrictions are 
effective in reducing crime.209  The variable support, mentioned in 
question five above, evaluated whether respondents favored residency 
restrictions even absent scientific evidence that they are effective.210 
Finally, the study explored whether and to what extent social-
demographic variables influenced the respondents’ perceptions of 
whether residency restrictions impose punishment.  To that end, the 
study examined the following additional variables relating to the 
respondents: (1) age; (2) gender; (3) parental status; (4) college 
degree (i.e., whether the respondent had attained an undergraduate 
degree or higher); (5) victim status (i.e., whether the respondent or 
someone close to him or her had been the victim of a crime); (6) know 
an offender (i.e., whether the respondent or someone close to him or 
her had been convicted of a crime).211 
 
 205  Id. at 142–43. 
 206  Id. at 143. 
 207  Levenson et al., supra note 32, at 143. 
 208  Id. 
 209  Id. at 143, 145. 
 210  Id. at 145. 
 211  Id. 
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B. The Results 
Sixty-one percent of the respondents either agreed or strongly 
agreed that making a sex offender move from his existing home 
constituted punishment.  However, only 39 percent either agreed or 
strongly agreed that prohibiting a sex offender from moving to a new 
address within 1,000 feet of a school imposed additional 
punishment.212  Thus, for a significant percentage of the respondents, 
the additional burden of having to move out of a current home made 
the difference in describing a residency restriction as punitive. 
By contrast, 71 percent of the respondents either agreed or 
strongly agreed that making a convicted DUI offender leave her home 
imposed additional punishment compared to 55 percent that believed 
prohibiting a DUI offender from moving to a new address within 1,000 
feet of a school imposed punishment.213 
Thus, the hypothesis that residency restrictions for DUI offenders 
would be seen as more punitive than the same restrictions for sex 
offenders was supported, though a majority believed that the 
restrictions would be punitive for either sex offenders or DUI 
offenders forced to move from an existing home.214 
Less than half of the respondents believed that residency 
restrictions were effective in preventing crime,215 but that such laws 
should be enforced even absent evidence of their effectiveness.216  
Those who thought sex offenders would recidivate, which constituted 
65 percent of respondents,217 “were significantly less likely to view 
policies that restricted where sex offenders can live as punitive.”218  
Additionally, both older respondents and respondents who knew 
someone with a criminal record were less likely to consider residency 
restrictions as punitive.219  Respondents who were crime victims were 
 
 212  Id. at 144 tbl.2. 
 213  Levenson et al., supra note 32, at 144 tbl.2. 
 214  Id. at 149. 
 215  Id. at 144 tbl.2 (reporting that 23 percent of respondents either agreed or 
strongly agreed that residency restrictions for drunk drivers prevent crimes, and that 
45 percent of participants either agreed or strongly agreed that residency restrictions 
for sex offenders work). 
 216  Id. (reporting that 48 percent of respondents either agreed or strongly agreed 
that laws designed to protect citizens from drunk driving should be enforced even if 
there is no scientific evidence that they are effective, and that 51 percent believed that 
such laws for sex offenders should be enforced even if there is no evidence of their 
effectiveness). 
 217  Id. 
 218  Id. at 146; see also Id. at 148 tbl.4. 
 219  Levenson et al., supra note 32, at 146, 149. 
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“2.8 times more likely to view” residency restrictions as punishment.220  
Interestingly, respondents with at least an undergraduate degree were 
“sixty-nine percent less likely to agree” that making sex offenders leave 
their home imposed additional punishment.221 
The authors theorized that respondents viewed residency 
restrictions as more punitive for DUI offenders than those who commit 
sex crimes because, among other things, respondents believe that 
“‘this [i.e., a DUI] could happen to me,’222 perhaps rendering the 
sample more sympathetic to the plight of drunk drivers and the 
potential consequences for a socially reprehensible but all too 
common behavior.”223 
C. What this study means for Mendoza-Martinez 
The study admittedly suffered from some limitations.  For 
instance, “the sampling methodology was less systematic than might be 
ideal,” due to lack of resources and the inability to conduct more 
interviews in public places like malls.224 
Additionally, although the authors kept the questionnaire brief to 
maximize participation,225 the brevity may have hampered the ability to 
evaluate more fully the public’s perception of what is and is not 
punitive and how such lay opinions could inform punishment 
determinations under Mendoza-Martinez.  For example, the 
questionnaire did not ask respondents to give a reason why residency 
restrictions did or did not impose additional punishment.  Because the 
questionnaire did not define the word “punishment” and did not ask 
respondents to explain their reasoning, it is impossible to know how 
respondents came to the conclusions they reached. 
Moreover, the “use of offenders of different gender (male sex 
offender and female DUI offender) may have affected the results,”226 
because people “tend to show more leniency toward female 
offenders.”227 
Furthermore, respondents received no information about the 
impact that residency restrictions would have on the offenders’ ability 
to find a residence.  The research assistants did not provide 
 
 220  Id. at 149. 
 221  Id. 
 222  Id. 
 223  Id. 
 224  Id. at 151. 
 225  Levenson et al., supra note 32, at 151. 
 226  Id. 
 227  Id. (citations omitted). 
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respondents with maps showing residential exclusion zones or any 
other information of the kind that litigants have provided to courts 
about the burdens imposed by residency restrictions.  The absence of 
such information could have resulted in fewer respondents 
characterizing residency restrictions as punitive.228 
In addition, respondents were not advised of the implications of 
a court determining that residency restrictions are punitive (i.e., that 
the prohibition could not be applied retroactively).  This information 
was withheld to limit the risk of a respondent giving a results-oriented 
answer (i.e., a respondent who believes residency restrictions are 
punitive but says otherwise because he wants the restriction to apply 
retroactively).  However, the survey could have concluded with 
questions asking if the respondent would change his answer if he knew 
that a court finding of punishment would mean that the statute could 
not apply retroactively.  It would have been interesting to see to what 
extent the public would take a results-oriented approach to answering 
the punishment question. 
Finally, although this study was not intended for use in Ex Post 
Facto Clause litigation, some questions about the fairness of applying 
residency restrictions to individuals who committed their crimes 
before the restriction became law would have been helpful to future 
litigation, given that the prevention of unfairness is one of the reasons 
the Framers prohibited ex post facto laws.  For example, using the 1 to 5 
Likert-type scale (“strongly agree” to “strongly disagree”), the survey 
could have asked a question along these lines: “It is unfair to prohibit 
a sex offender from moving to a home within 1,000 feet of a school 
under a law not in effect at the time he committed his crime.”  Such a 
question could help a court better appreciate the real-world impact of 
residency restrictions. 
Despite these issues, the study “lays the groundwork for some 
important “next steps” for researchers to consider.”229  These next steps 
include “unpack[ing] the meaning behind perceptions of residence 
restrictions as punishment” and “diversifying the scenarios to include 
different gradations of offenders” (e.g., repeat vs. first-time 
offenders).230  Future studies could remedy these flaws, enabling 
scholars to explore more deeply how the public defines punishment 
 
 228  Moreover, if “punitive” is a proxy for severe or harsh treatment that is unfair, 
the use of a male sex offender and female DUI offender could have caused more 
respondents to conclude that DUI residency restrictions are punitive given that many 
people tend to be more lenient to female offenders than male offenders. 
 229  Levenson et al., supra note 32, at 151. 
 230  Id. 
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and how that definition is relevant to punishment as a legal concept. 
Beyond its social science implications, the study also provides 
insight into how public opinion surveys could help courts determine 
whether a statute is punitive in effect.  In this regard, the study 
generated two particularly useful ideas that should be examined in 
more detail. 
First, exploring whether a sanction is punitive when applied to 
different offender types can illuminate the extent to which offender 
bias plays a role in punishment determinations and may help judges 
understand their own biases.  As discussed above, 55 percent of 
respondents believed that prohibiting a drunk driver from moving to 
a new residence within 1,000 feet of a place that sells alcohol imposed 
additional punishment, while only 39 percent believed that banning 
sex offenders from moving to a new home within 1,000 feet of schools 
constituted additional punishment.231  The prohibition remained the 
same in each scenario, while the only thing that changed was the type 
of offender.  Although it is unclear how each respondent defined 
punishment, assume for a moment that respondents defined 
punishment to mean an additional burden that was harsh and unfair.232 
The fact that 55 percent of respondents believed that barring DUI 
offenders from moving to homes within 1,000 feet of places that sell 
alcohol would impose punishment for DUI offenders, whereas only 39 
percent of respondents believed that a residency restriction 
prohibiting sex offenders from moving to a home within 1,000 feet of 
schools would be punitive, highlights society’s tolerance for laws that 
single out “maligned individuals and groups ‘of the moment’” for 
harsh treatment.233  This is precisely what the Ex Post Facto Clause is 
designed to prevent.234  While drunk driving poses a serious risk of 
harm to the community,235 many prominent members of society—
including politicians, judges, actors, and athletes—as well as ordinary 
citizens, are convicted of driving under the influence and are yet able 
to maintain their careers and social status.236  Accordingly, it is hard to 
 
 231  Id. at 144, tbl.2. 
 232  See Punishment, MERRIAM-WEBSTER, http://www.merriamwebster.com/diction 
ary/punishment (last visited Jan. 6, 2015) (defining punishment as “severe, rough, or 
disastrous treatment”). 
 233  Logan, supra note 10, at 1267, 1277 (quoting Fletcher v. Peck, 10 U.S. (6 
Cranch) 87, 138 (1810)). 
 234  Id. 
 235  See, e.g., Mich. Dep’t of State Police v. Sitz, 496 U.S. 444, 451 (1990) (“No one 
can seriously dispute the magnitude of the drunken driving problem or the States’ 
interest in eradicating it.”). 
 236  See Celebrity DUI Hall of Fame, GEORGE C. CREAL, JR., P.C., 
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imagine a legislature having the stomach to pass a law forbidding DUI 
offenders from living near alcohol stores, though it is possible to 
conceive of how such a restriction would be rationally related to a non-
punitive purpose of protecting children.237  Sex offenders, by contrast, 
receive a great deal of public scorn238 and are perhaps more likely than 
any other type of offender to be subjected to fear-driven laws.239 
Recognizing this dynamic—that legislatures single out unpopular 
groups for harsh treatment—is important.  If courts are to give full 
meaning to the Ex Post Facto Clause’s prohibition against retroactive 
punishments, then it is important that they focus more on the impact 
of the statute rather than the characteristics of the offender and 
whether those characteristics justify the imposition of oppressive 
disabilities or restraints.  Thus, public opinion surveys that present the 
same disability or restraint applied to different types of offenders—
including those who are more sympathetic—may help courts see that 
what the legislature denominates as regulatory is really punishment 
targeted at an unpopular and reviled group. 
Second, the fact that a majority of respondents believe sex 
offender residency restrictions are ineffective but should be enforced 
anyway is powerful evidence that these restrictions further retributive 
aims.  The results suggest that the majority of respondents find these 
restrictions as an acceptable condemnation of people who commit 
morally reprehensible sexual crimes.240  Presenting survey results that 
show the public’s willingness to impose harsh burdens irrespective of 
whether those burdens protect the community may help courts 
appreciate the retributive nature of statutes the legislature has 
denominated as civil, and give that factor the weight it deserves in the 
Mendoza-Martinez framework. 
 
 http://www.georgecreal.com/dui-hall-of-fame.html#.UxTEkIWtLeI (last visited Jan. 
6, 2015) (listing, among others, former President George W. Bush, former Vice 
President Dick Cheney, former NBA star Charles Barkley, celebrity chef Cat Cora, pop 
singer Taylor Dayne, actor Ray Liotta, and federal Judge Robert Somma as DUI 
perpetrators). 
 237  Because case law does not require a statute to have “a close or perfect fit with 
the nonpunitive aims it seeks to advance” in order to be found rationally connected to 
a nonpunitive purpose, Smith v. Doe, 538 U.S. 84, 103 (2003), a residency restriction 
for DUI offenders would likely be found rational. 
 238  See supra note 15 and accompanying text.  
 239  Singleton, supra note 16, at 604–10 (discussing how media coverage of high-
profile child abduction cases created a culture of fear leading to the passage of 
residency restrictions). 
 240  See, e.g., Scott W. Howe, The Eighth Amendment as a Warrant Against Undeserved 
Punishment, 22 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 91, 98 (2013) (defining retribution as “the 
application of the pains of punishment to an offender who is morally guilty”) (internal 
quotation marks and citations omitted). 
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CONCLUSION 
Including public opinion evidence as a factor under Mendoza-
Martinez’s framework would not magically solve all its problems.  
Analysis under Mendoza-Martinez would continue to be subjective, given 
that courts necessarily must exercise judgment in deciding how to 
apply the factors.  Courts conducting the Mendoza-Martinez analysis will 
continue to defer to legislative intent—perhaps unduly so—under 
controlling Supreme Court precedent.241  The way to address the 
problems identified in Part II, supra, is to replace Mendoza-Martinez with 
a new punishment test, perhaps along the lines that Justice Stevens or 
Professor Fellmeth suggests.242 
But unless and until the Supreme Court selects a new test, 
Mendoza-Martinez is the law, and its framework allows consideration of 
additional factors that are relevant to determining whether a statute 
has a punitive effect.243  Litigants should seize this opportunity to 
present opinion survey results that report the public’s perception of 
whether a statute’s effect is punitive. 
The main obstacle to admitting such evidence would be 
relevance.  While it is clear that public opinion polls are relevant in 
some contexts, it is less obvious that opinion polls are relevant in the 
punishment context.  But if the question Mendoza-Martinez seeks to 
answer is whether a statute is punitive in effect (as opposed to 
purpose), then the real world perspectives of lay people are both 
relevant and helpful to the analysis.  If public opinion surveys indicate 
that a strong majority of respondents believe that a particular statute is 
punitive, then it would be much harder for courts to gloss over other 
Mendoza-Martinez factors that point to a statute’s punition.  Thus, the 
real value of adding public opinion as a Mendoza-Martinez factor may 
be to force courts to render more intellectually honest decisions about 
what constitutes punishment. 
 
 
 241  See, e.g., Kansas v. Hendricks, 521 U.S. 346, 361 (1997) (“[W]e will reject the 
legislature’s manifest intent only where a party challenging the statute provides the 
clearest proof that the statutory scheme [is] so punitive either in purpose or effect as 
to negate [the State’s] intention to deem it civil.”) (internal quotation marks and 
citation omitted) (all but the first alternation as original). 
 242  See supra notes 61–64 and accompanying text. 
 243  Smith v. Doe, 538 U.S. 84, 97 (2003) (describing the Mendoza-Martinez factors 
as “neither exhaustive nor dispositive”) (internal quotation marks and citations 
omitted). 
